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With the growth of emerging economies in Asia-Pacific over the last three decades collaboration 
with the aim of innovation between firms within and with partners outside the region have developed 
substantially. Not always have such partnerships fulfilled their anticipated strategic objectives. The 
literature suggests that the nature of market arrangements and the role of government within that 
system play a role, but also innate contracting practices and governance of innovation partnerships 
are related. Yet, our understanding about the specific relationships between these factors and the 
emerging partnership innovation culture that facilitates joint business activities in an Asia-Pacific 
context remains vague. In this conceptual chapter we suggest how characteristics of so called 
network capitalism in conjunction with the nature of contractual agreements between partners, the 
alignment of their innovation objectives and the ambiguity inherent in their mutual contributions to 
the partnership can be interpreted as indicators of joint innovation culture. However, while 
innovation partnerships generally may result to be bureaucratic, market, clan, or adhocracy, we 
discuss how in an Asia-Pacific context, innovation partnerships are limited by the extent of 
codification and diffusion of information and the social embeddedness of economic transactions. 
 
Keywords: Innovation partnerships, contracting, innovation culture, network capitalism  
1 Introduction 
In the last decade the Asia-Pacific region has become ever more central to the long-term strength and 
prosperity of the global economy. While the most significant development continues to be the rise of 
China, the entire region is becoming more economically integrated. The past years saw substantial 
progress on a number of major trade deals that will further strengthen the region’s status as the 
engine of global economic growth. Not only has foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region grown 
over the years, also outbound foreign direct investment (ODI) by, for example, non-state-owned 
Chinese companies increased by 35% in only ten years (MofCom, 2013). According to the Ministry 
of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, the countries ODI may have exceeded FDI for the 




A number of previously regional players have grown to become global players by attracting foreign 
investment and by forging partnerships within and outside the region, which has helped reinforcing 
their foothold in the global business community.  
Numerous studies have investigated the development strategies of these firms (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
2000; Ibeh, Johnson, Dimitratos, & Slow, 2004; Rialp, Rialp, & Knight, 2005), however little is 
known about their capacity for further growth based on their capacity to innovate. Yet, innovation is 
the central strategy for many companies in the region to endure and develop in what are increasingly 
competitive and dynamic business settings. Co-operation is a vital way for companies to achieve 
innovation objectives. Regardless of the term ‘innovation’ being notoriously ambiguous and often 
lacking a specific definition or measure (Adams, Bessant, & Phelps, 2006) commercial, non-
commercial and government organizations alike view innovation as an essential way of improving 
managerial efficacy, profitability and overall economic performance. In this chapter, we understand 
innovation in Schumpeter’s (1934) terms, who incorporates five types of activity; new production 
methods, new sources of supply, the creation of new products, the capitalization of new markets, and 
organizing business in new ways. The latter especially contains new methods of creating value 
through collaboration.  
Many enablers of innovation strategies have been explored. Examples include strategic vision, 
culture, governance, and sense of urgency of the organization. Firms that successfully balance 
exploitative and explorative ways of innovation do so by aligning infrastructure, resources and 
organizational strategy to create dynamic innovation capabilities (Clegg, Carter, Kornberger, & 
Schweitzer, 2011). However, the concept of developing unique competences within the boundaries 
of one company as an exclusive source of strategic advantage is particularly insufficient in 
contemporary markets in Asia Pacific. Closed innovation based on self-reliance of R&D is often too 
slow and also expensive (Edwards, Logue, & Schweitzer, 2015). Thus, during the past three decades 
innovation has gone through evolutionary steps to collaborative innovation and more recently to 
open-innovation and co-innovation (Lee, Olson, & Trimi, 2010).  
We focus on collaborative innovation, which includes partnerships, strategic alliances, joint 
ventures, and technology/patent relationships that allow firms combining own competencies with 
those of other firms (Gudergan & Schweitzer, 2008). Examples in Asia Pacific include firms such as 
Nissan, Samsung or the Dongfeng Motor Group and outside the region companies like SEEK, 
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Apple, Cisco, HP, Dell, Procter & Gamble and many others that have successfully collaborated 
(Tapscott & Williams, 2008).  
Specific alliances are often described very broadly, so that it is nearly impossible to differentiate 
them from other types of inter-firm relationships and economic transactions like e.g. supplier 
relationships. As “hybrid” organizational forms they are a way to manage exchanges or relationships 
that are more complex than a standard market exchange since they involve purposive linkages (Kale, 
Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000), exchange, sharing or co-development (Gulati, 1995b) - yet they do not 
merit full integration (Gulati, 1998; Williamson, 1991; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). Hence, we see 
innovation alliances as a unique form of organization, which in its simplest form can be defined as a 
group of stakeholders intentionally organized to accomplish an overall, common innovation goal, 
which is explicit or implicit, carefully considered and established through a strategic planning 
process.  
An example is the recently established Asia Pacific Innovation Center by Johnson & Johnson in 
Shanghai with satellites in Singapore, Australia and Japan, thereby extending the existing network of 
Johnson & Johnson’s strategic innovation initiatives in life sciences hotspots. The centre aims at 
identifying and developing early-stage opportunities across the company’s key strategic focus areas 
including pharmaceuticals, medical devices and diagnostics and consumer healthcare products. At 
the heart of this innovation strategy is to collaborate with the best minds in the region to advance 
new technologies and deliver transformative solutions for the people of China and Asia Pacific at 
large. 
Generally, alliances like the above mentioned have been shown to be effective mechanisms for 
transferring knowledge (Doz, 1996), spreading risk (Hennart, 1988), learning (Inkpen & Crossan, 
1995; Schweitzer & Gudergan, 2010) and innovation capability development (Schweitzer, 2014). 
Research studies have examined a host of factors that relate to how alliances are set up and what 
their role is in realizing strategic objectives. This growing body of research has also dealt with 
several aspects of innovation alliances and found, for example, that the ability to successfully set up 
and manage alliances is affected by the contracting and governance arrangements that are put in 
place. Similarly, research suggests a positive and significant role of organizational culture or climate 
on innovation (Ahmed, 1998; Isaksen, Lauer, Ekvall, & Britz, 2001; Lee, Tan, & Chiu, 2008) and 
that innovation within alliances can be achieved by creating a learning culture (Linnarsson & Werr, 
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2004). The specific aspects of alliance contracting, governance and culture are inter-related, but no 
yet well understood. Such interrelations are particularly important to understand in growing 
economic environments like the Asia Pacific region, since collaboration for innovation is taking up 
an increasing part of all innovation activity here (IBM, 2012).  
Our focus here is on examining the alliance contractual nature and culture as key aspects for 
effectively managing innovation partnerships in the Asia Pacific context. We develop a conceptual 
framework that is embedded in economic perspectives of network capitalism (Boisot & Child, 1996; 
Tung & Worm, 2001), organizational control theory (Ouchi, 1980) and theoretical developments on 
organizational culture (Cameron & Quinn, 2011) and alliance contracts and contractual complexity 
(Ariño & Reuer, 2006a; Reuer & Ariño, 2007).  Our objective is to add to the academic dialogue 
about contractual aspects and culture within Asia Pacific innovation alliances.  
2 Theoretical background  
2.1 Network Capitalism 
Boisot and Child (1996) coined the term ‘network capitalism’ to describe a distinctive institutional 
form that had evolved in China due to it’s continuing transformation and decentralization of a state 
controlled bureaucracy. Network capitalism occurred following a combination of limited 
information codification in China combined with communal property rights and organization of 
economic transaction. It is largely about the localization of transactions where economic subjects act 
locally instead of being involved in transactions in a depersonalized market with a potentially 
unlimited number of participants. In that way, China’s path via network capitalism to economic 
renewal and evidently substantial growth over the last three decades juxtaposes the Western way of 
market expansion, which is typically based on intensive information codification (Boisot & Child, 
1996; Boisot, Child, & Redding, 2011).   
Yet, the most relevant feature of network capitalism in the context of understanding its role for 
innovation partnerships is the depth and nature of its social embeddedness and closeness of its 
actors, which both have deep historical roots in Chinese cultural tradition. The Chinese system of 
network capitalism had grown under conditions of very considerable uncertainty and until today 
works through the implicit and fluid dynamic of trust-based relationships, where trust is heavily 
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based on familial or community membership that is normally difficult for outsiders to gain. Network 
capitalism is suited to handling complexity and uncertainty since networks offer greater capacity for 
generating and transmitting new information. If networks are enabled through trust-based 
relationships they even offer protection against the possibility of failure - the familiar associate of 
uncertainty.  
Boisot and Child describe closeness in network capitalism by borrowing the concept of ‘clans’ from 
Ouchi (1980), expressing how market transactions under network capitalism are embedded in ties of 
kinship, in other words: friendly relations. Clan structures appreciate the entrepreneurial potential of 
situations where, for example, government policies provide entry barriers the market.  They indeed 
create a structure for economic activities in informal sectors of the economy and are consequently 
very flexible and adaptable (Child & Ihrig, 2013). Not only the thriving economic activities in 
mainland China but also in Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Singapore are attributed to the fact 
that economic activities here are largely embedded in Chinese communities and their extended clan-
type structures (Fukuyama, 1996). The Chinese approach based on clan-like networks also has an 
advantage in handling and responding to cognitive complexity (Snell & Tseng, 2002). Hence, with a 
distinctive Chinese path to growth and modernization suggested, the widespread legitimacy of 
conventional Western assumptions is truly questioned (Boisot & Child, 1996). 
Further analysis of the difference between modernization in China and Western economies exposed 
the culture space or C-space (Boisot, 1986, 1987), a conceptual framework that relates the extent to 
which transactionally relevant information can be diffused, and hence shared, within a target 
population to how far it has been codified. Without effective codification and given traditional 
Chinese social organization and embeddedness, decentralization leads not to markets or hierarchies 
but to clans that permits a much more local and personalized social order of network capitalism.  
With now extended institutional possibilities it is possible to explain growth and innovation in 
China. Boisot and Child (2007; 2011) further suggest that modern information and communication 
technologies facilitate network capitalism by lowering the cost of transacting to less codified clan-
like structures within populations that are larger and located across great distances.  
We note that social embeddedness, information diffusion and information codification are three 
central features of network capitalism and associate clan-like structures, which are likely to 
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determine the development, governance, and management of innovation partnerships within the 
region and with partners from outside the Chinese and larger Asia-Pacific context.  
2.2 Governance 
Governance of innovation partnerships is about establishing mechanisms that influence and control 
partners and managers so that their decisions and actions aid common goals. The alliance literature 
distinguishes relational and formal governance mechanisms (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009) and also 
defines alliance governance structure by distinguishing non-equity and equity alliances. Formal 
governance mechanisms are policies, instruments, processes, and practices, which in innovation 
alliances can involve a performance based pay scheme, use of a board of directors, appointment of 
local partnership managers, or mutual agreement on formal provisions in a partnership contract. 
Relational governance relates to social mechanisms that promote open communication and the 
sharing of information, trust, cooperation and other informal encouragement of a specific work ethic. 
The alliance partners’ choices and combination of governance mechanisms results in a distinct 
governance form (or structure), which represents the joint organizational context in which the 
alliance takes place (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a).  
Both, formal and relational governance have been studied widely and are influenced by aspects like 
co-ordination costs and appropriation concerns (e.g. Gulati & Singh, 1998; Oxley, 1997); risks; 
partnership task-scope and transaction-level characteristics (e.g. Oxley, 1999; Oxley & Sampson, 
2004); technological intensity (Osborn & Baughn, 1990); strategic motivation (Nielsen, 2003); 
division of labour (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002); task complexity and inter-partner diversity (White 
& Lui, 2005); trust among partners (e.g. Gulati, 1995a; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006; 
Lui & Ngo, 2004; Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998); 
and inter-organizational structures (e.g. Gerwin & Ferris, 2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; 1992). 
The management and control of these factors is reflected in the use of contractual provisions 
between partners (e.g. Reuer & Ariño, 2003; Reuer, Ariño, & Mellewigt, 2006; Sampson, 2004), 
that is, partners use contracts to define mutual rights and obligations by specifying resource 
allocations, practices of interaction and problem solving, as well as expected outputs (e.g. Argyres, 
Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Ariño & Reuer, 2006a; Lerner & Merges, 1998; Luo, 2002). These 
arrangements provide the basis for operating the partnership. In this way, governance mechanisms 
correspond not only with the structure of the alliance, but also the emerging partnership culture.  
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2.3 Culture  
The organizational culture within innovation partnerships, while related to contracting and 
governance is also a function of the underlying values and beliefs of the people who are operating it 
and thereby define in a simple fashion the actor’s view of themself and their environment (Schein, 
2010). These beliefs and expectations serve as a normative order that influences how people 
perceive, think, feel and behave (O'Reilly, 1989). As such, culture may directly or indirectly 
influence alliance governance. While understanding the role of culture remains a difficult task due to 
its elusive nature (Duncan, 1989), it certainly plays an integral part both as a reflection of and 
influence on characteristics of innovation partnerships including - for example – the general 
economic paradigm and by extension the formality and centrality of decision-making, the level to 
which actions are based on mutual understanding and trust or the degree to which information is 
codified.  
Hence, while governance and culture of innovation partnerships are naturally related, they are also 
associated with contractual specifications and related complexity. Here, we focus on the emergent 
organizational culture of the partnership and follow organizational control theory to explain the 
occurrence of alternative types of partnership cultures. The organizational control perspective 
(Ouchi, 1980) and later additions (Cameron & Ettington, 1988; Mintzberg, 1993) suggest that 
different organizational cultures can be classified in terms of archetypes, namely market, clan, 
bureaucracy, adhocracy or any hybrid form of these. These types reflect the goal incongruence and 
performance ambiguity among partners (Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Ouchi, 1980). Goal incongruence 
refers to the fact that the goals of partners may not be entirely consistent, describing a state of 
diverging preferences or a lack of overlapping goals. Performance ambiguity, on the other hand, 
arises when the measurement of the partners’ contributions within the partnership is subject to 
uncertainty. 
Accordingly, antecedent factors to culture including levels of goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity result in any one of four archetype cultures being the most efficient to mediate joint 
transactions: market culture is efficient when performance ambiguity is low and goal incongruence 
is high, bureaucracy is efficient when both goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are high, 
clans are efficient when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high (Ouchi, 1980), 
and, finally, adhocracies are efficient when goal incongruence and performance ambiguity are low 
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(Cameron & Ettington, 1988; Mintzberg, 1993). The market culture type values productivity and 
efficiency; information is assumed complete and partners are aware of an explicit competitive price 
for each task or exchange. With a focus on achievement, this culture emphasizes centralized decision 
making and more formal coordination and control systems. The partners’ commitment to the joint 
organization’s objectives is obtained by self-interest and based on the price mechanism.  
Bureaucracies involve close personal surveillance and direction of subordinates by superiors with the 
information that is necessary for task completion being contained in rules. The cost of administration 
in bureaucracies is typically high. This culture values stability and control and emphasizes formal 
coordination, centralized decision-making and vertical communications where team members' roles 
are defined and enforced through formal rules and regulations.  
The clan culture adds a social dimension in assuming that in situations of great uncertainty and 
complexity, managerial control is established through the group’s system of beliefs and perceptions 
rather than through its behaviour or output. Accordingly, in clan culture it is assumes that individuals 
are acculturated into a system of controls and meanings. Structurally, there is less emphasis on 
formal coordination and control systems, and a greater emphasis on participation, decentralized 
decision-making, horizontal communications and teamwork.  
Lastly, adhocracies represent a highly organic and unordered organizational culture. Members within 
an adhocracy generally perform complex work in small teams with substantial personal 
communication. Adhocracy is designed to be flexible and adaptable to rapidly changing 
environments; it emphasizes growth and adaptability. Similar to the clan culture, there is an 
emphasis on informal coordination, control systems and horizontal communications (Quinn, 
Hildebrandt, Rogers, & Thompson, 1991; Zammuto & Krakower, 1991). 
The four cultural orientations are also confirmed by research that examined the relationship between 
organizational culture and effectiveness (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981) where it was shown that 
changes in effectiveness could be explained by an organization’s attention inward (toward internal 
dynamics) versus outward (toward external environment) and its preference for governance to depict 




We now consider the role and importance of contracting in innovation partnerships - specifically the 
contractual complexity of partnership agreements between innovation partners. A generally much 
observed heterogeneity of partnership agreements is due to variations in contractual complexity, 
which in turn reflects the often very different relational and situational characteristics of the 
partnership. Indeed, previous studies have suggested that complexity of agreements is the central 
concept of contracting (Reuer & Ariño, 2003). Following this work we understand contractual 
complexity as a design feature of the partnering firms’ agreements that reflects the number and 
stringency of the provisions that are being employed. Important aspects and antecedents of 
contractual complexity include asset specificity of the partnership, existence of prior ties among 
partnering organizations, time boundedness of the agreement, strategic importance of the 
partnership, and partner search costs (Reuer & Ariño, 2003).1 Although this work captures important 
aspects of contractual complexity, there are possibly additional factors like types of relational or 
environmental uncertainty, or the frequency of transactions between partners, or the underlying 
economic paradigm and organization of economic transaction as well as the degree to which 
information is codified that can affect the complexity of partnership agreements. Recognizing the 
early stage of research in understanding antecedents of contractual complexity we focus on the not 
yet systematically studied link between contractual complexity and partnership culture. 
While the different archetypes featured by the organizational control perspective address and explain 
social, cultural, and relational aspects of the partnership culture, the theory does not explicitly take 
into account the complexity of contractual provisions between parties; complexity that is 
heterogeneous across different types of partnerships. Yet, the conceptualization of contractual 
complexity (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a) and organizational culture (Ouchi, 1980) share theoretical 
foundation in transaction cost economics. Both perspectives assume environmental uncertainty, asset 
specificity, bounded rationality, and behavioural uncertainty to result in transaction costs that 
mediate the characteristics of the relationship between partnering organizations as well as their joint 
transactions. Hence, we consider the organizational control perspective as a suitable theoretical basis 
                                                
1 Asset specificity is the extent of the partners’ transaction-specific investments for the partnership; prior ties captures the 
role of previous partnerships; time boundedness is about the duration to operate the initiative; strategic importance is 
about the significance that partners give to their collaborative venture; and, finally, partner search concerns the costs that 
are associated with finding, evaluating, and negotiating with potential partners. 
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to address the role of contractual complexity in innovation partnerships because both goal 
incongruence and performance ambiguity share antecedents with contractual complexity.  
Goal incongruence, for example, is linked to asset specificity through related levels of decision-
making uncertainty and trust among alliance members; it relates to partner search costs through 
associated efforts of strategic goal alignment in the process of finding innovation partners; it is 
associated with prior ties through the degree of behavioural uncertainty and trust among partners; 
and it relates to the time boundedness of the partnership through the partners’ ability to better predict 
environmental uncertainties when the duration of the partnership is predetermined.  
Performance ambiguity too, is linked to prior ties through existing experience and trust among 
partners, and it relates to time boundedness through potentially opportunistic partner behaviour in 
fixed term partnerships. In addition to the common set of antecedents, recent research has shown that 
variation in partnership governance can also be attributed to contractual complexity (e.g. Reuer & 
Ariño, 2007), a concept distinctively different to both goal incongruence and performance 
ambiguity.  
In sum, to better understand the role and potential of innovation partnerships in the Asia-Pacific 
region, we need to further discuss the theoretical relationships between social embeddedness of 
actors, diffusion and codification of information (as features of network capitalism) and contractual 
complexity, performance ambiguity and goal incongruence (as key aspects of partnership 
governance, contracting and culture). We suppose that the here presented perspectives of network 
capitalism, organizational control and contracting provide not only a comprehensive explanation for 
emerging innovation cultures but also a suitable theoretical foundation for our conceptual 
framework.  
3 Towards a model of Network Capitalism in Asia-Pacific innovation partnerships 
3.1 Contractual complexity and partnership culture 
First, we argue that the culture of innovation partnerships may differ depending on the complexity of 
contractual provisions. That is, the various enforcing and coordinating aspects of contractual 
provisions that guide joint transactions provide control beyond safeguarding partners against 
unforeseen events or partner opportunism (Ariño & Reuer, 2006a) since they, together with goal 
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incongruence and performance ambiguity, influence the culture of the partnership. In what follows 
we discuss high, low, and moderate levels of contractual complexity and derive different effects for 
each of them. 
Contractual complexity refers to the stringency of the provisions to control various aspects of the 
partnership. This can include, for example, enforcement provisions like a detailed account of 
property rights and knowledge sharing, or informational aspects like measures of performance for 
each partner organization. Poppo and Zenger (2002) assert that complex contracts are more detailed 
regarding the specification of promises, obligations, and processes for the resolution of 
disagreements. Complex contracts include details like roles and responsibilities to be performed or 
specific procedures for monitoring, consequences of non-compliance, and description of expected 
outcomes or output.  
A bureaucratic culture emerges when the parties to a partnership seek to eliminate the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour by quantifying and monitoring joint activities and mutual performance. 
Hence, within bureaucracies, partners assume that the majority of contingencies can be dealt with by 
policies, standardized procedures, formal division of responsibility, and hierarchical structures 
(Mintzberg, 1993), which are typically established within the contractual agreement for the 
partnership.  
Low levels of contractual complexity, on the other hand, mean that there are few and lenient 
provisions agreed upon. Partners may deliberately choose to only agree on a few provisions and not 
control aspects of the partnership because of high information costs or because contract terms may 
not be enforceable or are assumed to evolve as the partnership unfolds. Partners may then find it 
necessary to renegotiate their contracts at some stage, either because they encounter situations in 
which the contract is silent or where the contract specifies inefficient terms. Yet, while a contractual 
agreement between collaborating organizations may only encompass a few agreements for a fraction 
of the partnership’s scope, it can still enforce and entirely safeguard partners’ interests for the given 
situation. A complex contract, in contrast, including less enforcement but more informational 
provisions, might fail to protect partners’ interests because of a lack in stringency of the set 
provisions. Overall, less contractual complexity gives partners more flexibility to experiment with 
different ways to control and shape the innovation partnership, while at the same time exposing it to 
more risk involved with uncertain situations.  
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Within adhocracies formal and complex contractual agreements are rare because intensive informal 
interaction, spontaneity, casualness, and interpersonal familiarity act as their coordinating and 
integrating mechanisms (Jarillo, 1988). Because of these characteristics, adhocracies rely more on 
relational contracts (e.g. Bryant & Colledge, 2002; Goldberg, 1976; Heide, 1994; Macaulay, 1963) 
than on explicit and formal contracts. That is, innovation partners demonstrate flexibility and 
solidarity while solving problems as they desire continuity in the relationship, so that increased co-
operation, dependency, mutual trust, and commitment make it unnecessary to cover all contingencies 
in complex agreements (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Jeffries & Reed, 2000). Low contractual 
complexity can therefore support the development of adhocracy cultures for innovation partnerships; 
it helps foster minimal formalization of procedures, a highly organic structure, and mutual long-term 
relationships (Achrol, 1997; Daft, 1995). It also allows partners to make decisions without the 
presence of hierarchical structures and policies (Cameron & Ettington, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979).  
Hence, the interplay of contractual complexity, performance ambiguity, and goal incongruence is 
associated with different organizational cultures. While high levels of contractual complexity, 
performance ambiguity, and goal incongruence may lead to bureaucracies, low levels of contractual 
complexity, performance ambiguity, and goal incongruence may lead to adhocracy governance. We 
encapsulate the above by advancing the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: High contractual complexity, high goal incongruence, and high performance 
ambiguity in innovation partnerships is associated with bureaucracy culture. 
Hypothesis 2: Low contractual complexity, low goal incongruence, and low performance 
ambiguity in innovation partnerships is associated with adhocracy culture. 
Moderate contractual complexity represents the partners’ intention to balance between too much and 
too little control through contractual provisions. We associate the clan and market cultures with 
moderate levels of contractual complexity and suppose that moderate contractual complexity in 
combination with high performance ambiguity and low goal incongruence results in clan culture, 
while moderate contractual complexity in combination with low performance ambiguity and high 
goal incongruence results in market culture.  
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This is supported by the characteristics and the information requirements of clan and market 
cultures. In a partnership that has the attributes of a clan, trust and mutual understanding among the 
members usually reduces the need for monitoring, both in the pre-contractual and post-contractual 
phases. Consequently, the formal contracts that bind partners would likely display greater levels of 
completeness when opportunistic behaviour is a possibility. On these grounds, Williamson and 
Ouchi distinguish between “hard” and “soft” contracting and argue that soft contracting represents 
the clan-type culture. Hence, clan culture presumes that the identity of interests between the parties 
is much closer and formal contracts among parties are incomplete (Williamson, 1975). Further, clan 
culture is based on traditions where information is implicit; existing but mostly unstated (Ouchi, 
1979), it is embedded in established systems of shared values and beliefs, common goals, and 
mutual understanding that, once adopted, are only moderately explicit and complex. While clan 
members may share general orientations but not necessarily specific knowledge (Williamson, 1975), 
they trust each other and trust the fact that know-how always stays within the clan, and that whatever 
action they take based on whatever knowledge they possess will ultimately be beneficial for all. 
Accordingly, there is less need to contractually formalize knowledge transfer, restrict knowledge 
sharing, and safeguard against knowledge spill over effects, since a common vision, shared 
objectives, and relational bonds among members of the clan predict those risks sufficiently. 
The market culture, on the other hand, represents an open structure in which highly autonomous 
partners establish contractual relationships that are characterized by discrete, often short-term, 
agreements that aim to facilitate an economically efficient exchange. Partner performance is 
unambiguous because the conditions and agreements of the collaboration are specific, complete, and 
monetized. Hence, information requirements within market cultures are explicit, fully accessible, 
and easy to understand (Ouchi, 1979) so that a market culture is based on simple mechanisms 
following simple contracts. Moreover, within market culture, exchange objects tend to be non-
specific, that is, the resources, products, services or knowledge that a partner contributes can also be 
found with other partners (Macneil, 1978; Williamson, 1985). Therefore, highly complex contractual 
agreements are not necessary since the competitive marketplace and standard contract regulations 
and corresponding laws provide efficient safeguards to the parties for mediating their transactions 
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Besides, in a market culture, partners are equal and free, so that social 
relations among them are limited since developing them could incur costs or be irrelevant 
(Williamson, 1985). As a consequence, partners avoid the costs of agreeing on complex contracts 
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that can influence and control their transactions. We encapsulate the above in the following two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3: Moderate contractual complexity, high goal incongruence, and low 
performance ambiguity in innovation partnerships are associated with market culture. 
Hypothesis 4: Moderate contractual complexity, low goal incongruence, and high 
performance ambiguity in innovation partnerships are associated with clan culture. 
3.2 Innovation partnership culture and network capitalism 
Organizational culture has been repeatedly and consistently shown to play an important role for 
innovation (Chang & Lee, 2007; Higgins & McAllaster, 2002; Lau & Ngo, 2004; Lloréns Montes, 
Ruiz Moreno, & Miguel Molina Fernández, 2004; Martins & Terblanche, 2003; Mumford, 2000) 
(Obendhain & Johnson, 2004; Ruigrok & Achtenhagen, 1999). While not many studies have 
examined the role of culture in the Asia-Pacific context, some studies argue from a Western 
European perspective, that in order to innovate firms have to meet clear requirements in regards to 
the managerial behaviour within the organization and its management of external relationships 
(Tylecote, 1996). Others (Siguaw, Simpson, & Enz, 2006) point out that organizational culture is a 
facet of operational competency shaped by the innovation orientation of the firm.  
Overall, throughout the literature, culture plays a central part in achieving innovation objectives 
(Ahmed, 1998; Higgins & McAllaster, 2002; Jamrog, Vickers, & Bear, 2006; Jassawalla & 
Sashittal, 2002; Lau & Ngo, 2004; Martins & Terblanche, 2003; Mumford, 2000). It generally 
influences innovation in two ways: socialization and co-ordination (Tesluk, Farr, & Klein, 1997). 
We suggest that innovation partnerships are no different than other organisations in their tendency to 
develop their own organisational culture. Through socialization, members of the partnership learn 
whether creative and innovative behaviours are part of what is valued within the partnership. In 
addition, via co-ordination through activities, policies and procedures the partnership engenders 
values, which can encourage creative behaviour and reward innovation. As a result the innovative 
capacity improves. Hence, the culture of innovation partnerships determines the extend to which 
innovative behaviour among its members is inspired and innovation is accepted as a basic value 
(Dulaimi & Hartmann, 2006) so that members of the partnership can foster commitment to it.  
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We suggest that the core features of network capitalism including information diffusion, social 
embeddedness and information codification affect the ability for members of innovation partnerships 
to develop a culture that fosters innovation. The previous described theoretical relationships between 
contractual complexity, goal incongruence and performance ambiguity with partnership culture are 
controlled by the context in which they occur.  
Information codification is the selection and compression of data into stable structures (Shannon, 
2001); it exists on a continuum and alongside information diffusion. Boisot and Child explain: “If 
Zen masters trade in the kind of tacit knowledge that is hard to codify and that can only be imparted 
slowly and face to face to a limited number of disciples, bond traders, by contrast, deal in well-
codified prices that can be diffused worldwide in seconds by electronic means” (Boisot & Child, 
1996, p. 602). Hence, codification and diffusion of information make up the transactional 
environment and shape the conditions for institutional options of the participating actors. We suggest 
that low information diffusion under network capitalism confines the effect of goal incongruence but 
increases the effect of performance ambiguity on partnership culture, while low information 
codification under network capitalism reduces the effect of contractual complexity on partnership 
culture. 
Similarly, social embeddedness, which is defined as a kind of strong social situatedness or the extent 
to which modelling the behaviour of an actor requires the inclusion of other actors as individuals 
rather than as an undifferentiated whole (Edmonds, 1999), affect partnership culture. A high degree 
of social embeddedness reduces the effect of both goal incongruence and performance ambiguity on 
partnership culture. With typically uncodified information and limited or restricted information 
diffusion and high social embeddedness in China, we follow our logic and suggest that clan-like 
structures are the preferred institutional choice for partnerships in the region.  
We encapsulate the above in the following three additional hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5: Information diffusion moderates the effect of goal incongruence and 
performance ambiguity on partnership culture of innovation partnerships. 
Hypothesis 6: Social embeddedness moderates the effect of goal incongruence and 
performance ambiguity on partnership culture of innovation partnerships. 
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Hypothesis 7: Information codification moderates the effect of contractual complexity on 
partnership culture of innovation partnerships. 
Figure 1 depicts the proposed relationships.   
 
Overall, network capitalism favours clan culture that stresses flexibility while focusing on internal 
organization. Characteristics of clan-type innovation partnerships include teamwork, involvement 
and the partnering organisation’s commitment to members of the partnership. Autonomy and 
freedom based on social embeddedness, low information codification and diffusion encourage 
creativity, which is the key for developing innovations. This contrasts the existence of rules and 
regulations and excessive authority or poor participation of members that will limit the capacity of 
partnership members to assume the risks of innovation (Child, 1973).  
4 Conclusion 
The present chapter is an initial theoretical investigation of the relationships between network 
capitalism and the contractual complexity of partnership agreements, the goal incongruence and 
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performance ambiguity among innovation partners as well as the implications of these factors for the 
organisational culture of innovation partnerships. Our aim was to clarify the intricacies of certain 
facets of the Asia-Pacific region in conjunction with current thinking about how partnerships achieve 
the necessary conditions for achieving innovation outcomes. We discussed the roles of information 
codification and diffusion and social embeddedness as important elements of network capitalism and 
their relationship with contractual complexity, goal incongruence and performance ambiguity as 
important factors determining the organisational cultures present in contemporary innovation 
partnerships.  
Bureaucracy, market, clan, and adhocracy cultures are different alternatives to safeguard 
opportunistic threats in innovation partnerships based on their associated levels of goal 
incongruence, performance ambiguity, and contractual complexity. Yet – in the Asia-Pacific context 
such choices might be limited given the effect of network capitalism. The primary objective of our 
framework is to discuss and integrate the related literature, thereby framing network capitalism as an 
important factor for the development of innovation partnerships in the region.  
Our framework contributes to the study of innovation, contracting, and governance in various ways. 
While previous research regarding contractual complexity in innovation partnerships has focused on 
the role and importance of contributory influences (e.g. Ariño, Ragozzino, & Reuer, 2006; Ariño & 
Reuer, 2006a; Reuer & Ariño, 2002, 2007; Reuer et al., 2006), our conceptualization further expands 
this research by discussing the implication of contractual complexity for partnership innovation 
culture. In the same way, we begin to fill an important gap in the partnership culture literature by 
examining a specific aspect, that is, network capitalism, and its implications for emerging 
partnership cultures and structures in Asia-Pacific.  
From a managerial perspective our conceptual framework suggest how important it is for innovation 
partners to better understand what the roles of strategy, contracts and performance expectations are 
particularly when aiming for specific innovation outcomes with partners in Asia-Pacific. For 
example, the firm’s ability to negotiate partnership contracts under of network capitalism is greatly 
influenced by a range of factors which, when explicit and better understood, can help the partners 
avoid futile complex agreements or, on the other hand, include critical agreements to safeguard 
against the unwanted actions of partners and innovation team members.  
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A limitation of our framework and this study is that it rests on restricted theoretical assumptions. 
Even though we focus on the perspectives of network capitalism and organizational control theory, 
there might be other aspects of partnership and alliance management that would be important to 
consider. For example, Ring and Van de Vens’ (1994) process perspective of alliance contracting 
implies an influence of a psychological contract on the behavioural uncertainty that the contracting 
parties face once they are partners. Another theoretical perspective that we have not considered here 
and which has in general not been considered much in the field of partnership management and 
governance is the organizational behaviour perspective (Ariño & Reuer, 2006b).  
Future research could, for example, include further factors that determine the environment of 
economic transactions in Asia-Pacific, or take a specific look at the implications of the relationships 
proposed in this chapter and examine how they relate to other innovation management and 
collaboration phenomena.  This may include various types of behavioural dynamics at the individual 
or group level, process dimensions of collaboration, and the organizational and managerial context 
of partnership formation and management including managerial capabilities, leadership behaviour, 
and the functioning of teams within and across organisations. Hence, expanding on the model 
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